MARKET DESIGN AND TESTBEDS: An Aquaculture Application of a A Continuous Combinatorial Ascending Bids Auction

Charles R. Plott

California Institute of Technology

April 2016

The government is dissatisfied with the administrative methods it has used to regulate and allocate the rights to water use.

expensive
time consuming/slow
economically inefficient
wastes resources
leads to complaints
political pressure

but the problems are complex



Leasing and licensing within aquaculture fisheries reserves

Bruce Gray - Department of Sustainability & Environment Anthony Forster - Department of Primary Industries




24/04/2016


The Aquaculture Zones




- 1 Bates Point (25 ha)
- 2 Clifton Springs (315 ha)
- 3 Kirks Point / Werribee (200ha)
- 4 Grassy Point (252 ha)
- 5 Pinnace Channel (1000 ha)
- 6 Dromana (20 ha)
- 7 Mount Martha (150 ha)
- 8 Beaumaris (25 ha)
- 9 Flinders (440 ha)
- 10 Point Lillias (40 ha)
- 11 Avalon (17 ha)
- (12 Portland (200 ha))







BINARY CONFLICT MECHANSMS (BICAP)



Winning packages cannot intersect.

Non intersecting paths and routes, including time parameters, are applications.

Illustration 1. Bids, Provisional Winners, Clocks




Illustration 2. Fashion and Submit an Offer




Illustration 3. View the Offers (Provisional Winners)




Illustration 4. Ending the Auction

Each new bid resets the <u>new bid</u> clock to three minutes (unless otherwise announced).

Watch the clocks

Each new Provisional Winner resets the <u>new winner</u> clock to ten minutes (unless otherwise announced).

The auction ends when either the <u>new bid clock</u> or the <u>new winner clock</u> counts down to zero. Time on both clocks means that the auction is still open for bidding on all items.

When the auction ends the Provisional Winners become the Auction Winners.




Illustration 5. Offer Management (Offer Modification form)






Illustration 6. View the Offers (Complete Offer List)



Currently non
Provisional Winner

Illustration 7. Strategy Tools



Testbeds

Financial incentives

Maximum efficiency known to experimenter


Problem complexity is controlled


Human errors and mistake potentials studied

Experiments involve increasing scale

Figure 1 relatively easy parameters

Figure 2 relatively hard parameters







16 items 5 bidders Optimal allocation shown


16 items 8 bidders Optimal allocation shown

 Table 1: Data

DATA	Number	Efficient	Actual	Efficiency	note:
	of bidders	allocation	allocation		experimental
		value	value		parameters
060411A	5	14296	14296	100%	easy
060411B	5	14296	14296	100%	easy
060517A	5	14926	14926	100%	easy
060519A	5	14296	14296	100%	easy
060519B	5	14296	14296	100%	easy
060511	8	10000	10000	100%	hard
060524	8	10000	10000	100%	hard
060525A	8	10000	8550	85.5%	hard –A person
					bought almost all –
					lost money
060525B	8	10000	6900	69%	hard – A key
					person bought only
					1 and lost money
					on it.
					The two poor
					formers are
					included as
					examples that
					demonstrate the
					nature of the
					insights produced
					by testbed
					experiments.







v ivolia.

Using a new allocation method such as an electronic combinatorial auction to allocate resources clearly presented some risks for the Department. However, I am assured that your professionalism and your experience played a big part in minimising these risks, and for that I am grateful. The success of this auction will pave the way for use of other competitive allocation methods in the future, both within the Department and possibly across other Victorian Government Departments.

Since auction day, I have been informed that many bidders (both winners and non-winners) complimented the Department on the fairness and user-friendly nature of the auction system. I am not aware of any complaints regarding the difficultly of the auction system.

Thank you for a job well done. I hope that you will offer your services to us again in the future.

Yours sincerely,

PETER HARRIS

Secretary



For more information about DPI visit the website at www.dpi.vic.gov.au or call the Customer Service Centre on 136



Design skills differ from skills useful for participants. In order to use it you do not need to know how it works.



Some participants are more skillful than others.